1. Introduction

1.1 Who needs that

2.1 Non reversible isolation

2.2 Isolation areas

2.3 New system calls

2.4 Limiting super-user: The capabilities system

2.5 Enhancing the capability system

2.6 Playing with the new system calls

2.6.1 Playing with /usr/sbin/chcontext

2.6.2 Playing with /usr/sbin/chcontext as root

2.6.3 Playing with /usr/sbin/chbind

2.6.4 Playing with /usr/sbin/reducecap

2.7 Unification

3. Applications

3.1 Virtual server

3.2 Per user fire-wall

3.3 Secure server/Intrusion detection

3.4 Fail over servers

4. Installation

4.1 The packages

4.2 Setting a virtual server

4.3 Basic configuration of the virtual server

4.4 Entering the virtual server

4.5 Configuring the services

4.6 Starting/Stopping the virtual server

4.7 Starting/Stopping all the virtual servers

4.8 Restarting a virtual server from inside

4.9 Executing tasks at vserver start/stop time

4.10 Issues

4.11 How real is it ?

6. Future directions

6.1 User controlled security box

6.2 Kernel enhancements

6.2.1 Per context disk quota

6.2.2 Global limits

6.2.3 Scheduler

6.2.4 Security issues

6.2.4.1 /dev/random

6.2.4.2 /dev/pts

6.2.4.3 Network devices

7. Alternative technologies

7.1 Virtual machines

7.2 Partitioning

7.3 Limitation of those technologies

6.2.4 Security issues

The current kernel + patch provides a fair level of isolation between the virtual servers. User root can't take over the system: He sees only his processes, has only access to his area of the file system (chroot) and can't reconfigure the kernel. Yet there are some potential problems. They are fixable. As usage grows, we will know if they are real problems. Comments are welcome:

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